Brigham Young University International Law & Management
Review
Volume 1 | Issue 1

Article 6

8-16-2005

The EU Data Protection Directive: Implementing
A Worldwide Data Protection Regime and How
the U.S. Position has Progressed
Seth P. Hobby

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr
Part of the E-Commerce Commons, International Business Commons, Internet Law Commons,
and the Privacy Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Seth P. Hobby, The EU Data Protection Directive: Implementing A Worldwide Data Protection Regime and How the U.S. Position has
Progressed, 1 BYU Int'l L. & Mgmt. R. 155 (2005).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/ilmr/vol1/iss1/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young
University International Law & Management Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

THE

EU

DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE: IMPLEMENTING

A WORLDWIDE DATA PROTECTION REGIME AND
THE

U.S.

How

POSITION HAS PROGRESSED

INTRODUCTION

In a world where e-commerce and information technology continue to
increase exponentially in global pervasiveness, and arc high on the agenda of
every notable and self-respecting corporation-whether large and seeking to
maintain market share, or small and looking for rapid expansion-the prevailing
conditions naturally amplify particular challenges that are inextricably linked to
the expansion of such innovative business mediums. t Such large and accelerated
growth is almost always closely followed by regulatory intervention of some
description, as govemments attempt to identify an appropriate balance between
the competing aims of entrepreneurial endeavor and consumer protection. In this
regard, the juxtaposition of the universal commercially linked technological
swell with an equally ubiquitous awareness and focus on individual privacy,"
inherent human rights, and corporate responsibility,' quickly leads to a
discussion of the protcction of personal data. In a technology driven economy,

I While it was prcyiously thc casc thatthc title of"ll1ultinational corporation" was rcservcd il)r only
the largcst organi/ations \\ ith vast resources, holloll1less revcnue sourccs, and cmployecs spread copiously
around the glohe, the intcrnet generation has enabled almost any company with cnough tcchnological sav vy to
expand its operations to a host of countries using, almost cxclusi\c!y, online capahilities. S~~ Joseph .I.
Laferrcra, Implicali!JIIs
the 1:'lIroIICall Ullioll Directil'c Oil Dala Proll'clio/l (Mar. 17, 20(5).
h IIp:/!w\\,\\,. gesmcr.com!pu bl icati ons! in tcrnat ionali9. ph p.

or

2 This is particularly so in Europc. SI'I'. eg, Douglas v. Hello l Ltd., 1003 All E.R. 110 (2003), as
one of many high prolile examples of cascs involving indiyidual rights to privacy, eycn in a celebrity context.

3 See. e.g .. Nikc, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2()(l:1) (dealing with the legal rclationship of corporate
communications under the First Amcndmcnt, but highlighting thc currcnt climate of sensitivity betwcen
corporate behavior and fundamental human rights).
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where information can be rapidly aggregated, sorted, and analyzed for an array
of commercial advantages, personal information may be tantamount to gold dust
to companies of virtually every field. 4 Consequently, the race is on both to collect
personal information and exploit it in the corporate quest to increase the eversacred bottom line. Concurrently, the focus on protecting such information, for
so long a peripheral aim in many countries, has been inevitably heightened;
which in turn has led to the adoption of vast investigation and subsequent
regulation in many countries.
If it can be argued that the United States has been at the cutting edge of
technological expansion in the commercial realm, the European Union ("EU") is
undoubtedly advancing the cause of data protection through regulation; the
perception of the efficacy and necessity of that regulation, however, can be
debated. In October 1995, the European Community adopted "Directive
95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data" (the "Direetive"),5 laying
out a comprehensive harmonizing data privacy regime to be implemented by the
EU's member states within three years.t> Although the primary goal of the
Directive was to inculcate unity of data protection regulation among the states of

4 Si!i! .lames M. Assey, .lr. & Demetrios A. Elctlheriou, The EU Us. Primer Sa/I! flur/J"r: Smooth
Suiling or Trouhli!d Ilit/as:), 9 C()\lhlL~II' COt-;S1'1('II:S 145 (20() I) (discussing the growth of internet commerce
and the background leading to the inception of the EU U.s. Safe Harbor Agrecment).
5 Council Directive 95/46,EC. 19950..1. (L 2XI).11 [hereinatlcr Directive[.
- (, Iii. art. .12. Article 249 of the E.l'. Treaty dictates that a Dircctil'e emanating hom the European
Council "shall be binding, as to the result to be achicved, upon each I\lclllber State, to v.hich it is addressed. but
shall leave to the national authorities the choice of /(lI'IllS and methods." IT T~b\l\' art. 249 (ex. I X9). Thus,
although the principal aim of the Data Proli:ction Directive was harmonization of the laws among member states
relating to the protection of personal data, in reality. the Directilc simply sets Illinimum ,tandards that mWit be
met by till' statc~ in their national i1l1pkmclltation. As will be discus~cd, thi~ in it~clf has caused some concern
regarding the efficacy of the hannoIliJ'atioll pr()cc~s . ."·cc LlIR()PI·:\'.,J ('{)i\11\11~:-:'[()'<, RI-P()RI I'R()\1 IH~
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the Union (then numbering fifteen),7 ccrtain provIsions contained within the
Directive dealing with data transfers to countries outside of the EU have an
absolute impact on the data protection policies of every nation that trades with an
EU member. x In essence, the Directive prohibits transfers of personal data') from
an EU member state to any non-member nation that does not engender an
"adequate level ofprotection."lo Consequently, given that at the inception of the
Directive no single nation in the world had a data protection framework even
remotely close to that required by EU's mandate, such a requirement automatically injected the international community with a dose of insecurity over its
future trade potential with the EU.
When considered in a broad global context, it is hard to avoid the feeling
that the EU's implementation of sllch a wide sweeping regulatory exercise in the
realm of fundamental human rights II goes too far by effectively creating a worldwide data privacy regime utilizing the proverbial back door. Particularly in
nations such as the United States, which have historically taken a fundamentally

Cml~IISSI()"'.

("OM(03)265 tinal at II 12 Ihcrcinatler FIRS I

RIP()RTI.

Nevertheless. even where a member state

t~lils to adopt appropriatc national legislation within the time limit speciticd by a directive. thc provisions of the

directivc, insofar as reasonably possiblc, will under certain circumstances have direct etTect (as distinct Ii'om
direct applicability) on indiv'iduals wishing to usc the provisions of the directive in an action against the state,
hlrthermore, citizens that have suttered loss as a result of the member state's bilure to implement a directiv'C
may have a right of action j(lr damages against the state, For a general discussion of the direct clrect of
directives on member states and their citizens. sec A.M, I\R'-'I'II II AI" Wnf1 & DASIIVV'()Oll's E11R()PHN
UNION LA\\ X9 104 (4th cd, 2(00) Ihereinatler 1\i{1\1;[,[I,

7 I\nd potentially the threc European Economic I\rca mcmber countries: Norway, Lichtenstein. and
Iceland,
X See Directive,

.I111)m

note 5, arts, 25 26,

9 See id. art. 2ta) (de/ining "'personal data'" as '"any in/(mnation relating to an identified or identi-

fiable natural person'"),
10 /11, art. 25, For a discussion of the parameters required by the Directive to meet the adequate
protection threshold, sec il/ti-a Part II 1.1\.

II See ill, art. I ( I ).
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different approach on privacy regulation,'2 the EU's approach may have been
hard to swallow. Knowing that no country, even the commercial powerhouse that
is the United States, can afford to abrogate international trade with a commercial
block as large (both geographically and economically) and potentially valuable
as the EU,L' there is, in practical terms, very little choice other than to find a way
to comply with the European regime. '4 Consequently, there is a generic feeling
among those entities who collect and transfer data and those who necessarily
keep a watchful eye on trade regulation, that the EU has instituted an unadulterated global policy for data protection, spreading its tentacles far beyond its
own borders, and taking a sizeable bite out of the national sovereignty of every
nation that wishes to deal with the EU.
At least on their face, the EU's motivations for including the international transfer restrictions seem legitimate,!:i The EU has alluded to the need for
international compliance with equivalent protectionist policies for data
protection, in order that the "high standards of data protection established by the
Directive [not be] undermined, given the ease with which data can be moved

I~ u.s. D[PAKI~II,~! 01
('O\I:VII'l{( I, SAil
IIAKIHlK W()RKBOOK, ami/ahfe al
hltp://www.export.gO\/safcharbor.\hworkbook.html(last visikd Apr. 6, ~O()5) (discussing the sector-driven ad
hoc approach to privacy regulation) [hereinafter SA[ I' HAIWOJ{ WORKIl()()K [.
13 In 2002, Ihe lJnited Stale, had appl'Oximalely S37l) billion of Irade with the EU, including a
significant portion of electronic COlllmerce, which ;.,ubstantially
regulated by the Directive's provisions. ,';ee iii.

drivc~ cr()~~-bordcr

tlow . . . of information

14 Se\'eral countrics have already emharkcd on a complete o\'crhaul of their respccti\c privacy
regulations, including Australia, Argcntina, and Canada . ."iee James A. Harvey & Kimberley A. Verska, IV/iii I
Ihe !:lImp"all Dala PrimeI' Ohligalio/lS MC({II /01' U.S BlIsille\,.\('\', hltp:/lw\\w.gigala\\.com:articies:2001aWhan'ey-2001-02-all.html (last visited Apr. 6, 20()5). As will be discLissed, however, evcn such directivc
measurcs ha\'e not been entirely successful in placating the I:uropean regulatory juggernaut. See ill/i'(/ notes
7X XI and accompanying text.
COIllIll

PROf!{
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15 S'ee 1).\1'\ PROIITTIO'\ I~ IIII' LtJIWI'I.AN UNI()'I 12, (/I'lIi/lIhie III http://curopa.eu.int/
internal market:pri\'acy:docs:gui,bguide-ukingdolll en.pdfllast \ isitcd Apr. h, 20(5) [hereinafter D\IA
110'1[.
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around international networks."16 While this assertion is hard to dispute from a
realistie standpoint-partieularly considering the widely known difficulties of
enforcing international "law" in any arena-it is equally difficult to submit to the
concept that the regulation of personal data processing needs to be so broad and
regimented in the first place. This is particularly evident when one considers that
most countries appear to have been generally satisfied with their current regimes,
whether regulatory or industry-based. As such, one is tempted to suggest that if
the EU cannot effectively restrict the extraneous impact of its regulatory
endeavors, perhaps it needs to avoid such complex and far-reaching regimes. As
the EU should well understand in light of its own ongoing internal member state
wrangling over issues of sovereignty,17 no country likes to feel the downward
pressure of being dietated to concerning issues that may have significance in
terms of a nation's ability to regulate its own affairs, ergo national sovereignty,
simply by virtue of economic leverage.
Despite the wide ranging enforcement capabilities that the Directive
provides to the EU and its member states, there arc concerns that such measures
may be unnecessarily attempting to hold back a tank with a pellet gun. The result
of the EU's legislative exploits, in this complicated and extremely broad area,
may be nothing more than increased compliance costs and additional red tape for
corporations earnestly engaged in business on an international scale, while those

16M
17 For a general discussion of Ihc contlict betwccn I'LJ law suprcmacy and thc conscrvation of
national "nereignty. sec AR'Jl'l I • .I'llI'm note 6. at I:; I (,X.
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at whom the Directive is really aimed get lost among the tide of attempted
enforcement.
This paper looks at the background to the formation of the European data
protection regime, its ostensibly limitless application, and the extent to which its
ramifications indirectly regulate international trade and international data
privacy policy, with a particular emphasis on the dealings between the United
States and the EU. The United States as a whole has not been designated as a
country providing blanket "adequate protection" through an existing or
subsequently implemented privaey regime. On the other hand, there are only a
few nations that have been afforded such status. However, the United States is
the only nation to date to ciTeetively conduct negotiations with the EU and reach
a satisfactory compromise regarding alternative methods of meeting, or at least
circumventing, the strict requirements of article 25 governing third paI1y erossborder information flows. For its trouble, the United States has been placed under
the microscope of European Commission scrutiny in its ful fillment of the agreed
obligations, perhaps, partially at least, in recognition of thc common perception
that bringing the United States on board fully will eventually lead to closer
compliance with the EU regime by other countries.
BACKGROUND AND IMPLEMENTATION

The ELJ has developed an almost sinister reputation for entering into
regulatory pursuits that, despite generally genuine concerns underlying the
conception of the

endeavors,'~

often leave outsiders perplexed as to the EU's

I X Otten regulations arc motivated by countries lobbying to protect what they sec ," something
econOlnically beneticialto them that may be diluted without the impositioll of !()rlnal regulatiolls. Such was the
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justifications for its actions, causing speculation as to what the EU could possibly
he dreaming about regulating next. Often, the EU is perceived, even by the
citizens of its own member states, as a faceless bureaucratic institution that
concerns itself with such matters such as how straight a banana should really be
to be considered marketable, and whether chocolate of a certain constitution can
really be called chocolate.ll) Such measures, although generally engendering
legitimate concerns despite their facially absurd nature, have certainly not always
been received with open arms as individual nations have struggled to maintain
the balance of European solidarity with the often citizen-driven need to preserve
at least some semblance of national sovereignty and independence.
Moreover, such matters have at times thrown the EU into trade disputes
with individual nations, including the United States. In addition, broad-sweeping
EU-wide measures have at times violated or placed the EU in danger of
violating 211 its obligations under agreements with such international bodies as the
WTO.21 The impetus for the imposition of the EU's data protection regime,
however, was in keeping with two of the quintessential goals of the community:

case with chocolate, with countries such as Belgium seeking to preserve the "purity" of the chocolate
designation. Scc John T. Rourke & Mark A. Boyer, Whcl/ is II BIlI/III/" II BIlI/{II/{(J, http://highered.megrawhill.comisites i 00724X I 79x'studcnt viewO,ehapter71a further note 2.htl11l (last visited Apr. 6, 2(05).
19 St!t! Council Directive 20()()/36, 20()O 0..1. (L 197) 1925: scc IIlso Rourke & Boyer, slIpl'ilnote

I R.
20 Press Release, Directorate (ieneral Trade of the European Commission, FU Welcomes
Suspension of US Sanctions Following Re.solution of WTO Banana Dispute (July I, 20(1), {/\'l{illlhlt! III
h ttp: i. eu ropa. cu. int/commit rade/m it id ispu tei bana. ht mi.
21 Sec Eric Shapiro, Note, .111 Is Nol F"ir ill liIe I'ril'llc\' Trlltie: The S"fi' II"rhor Igree/llclllllllti Iht!
1""'1d limit! (hgllllbllioll, 71 FOIWII.\\I L. RI.I. 27XI (2003): see lIlso, e.g., \Vorld Trade Organization, FC
C'lIilnl Stalt!s Accepl Rllggiero ('o/llpmlllise Oil BllIllIlIlI Displile (.Ian. 29, 1999), III http://www.wto.nrg
ienglishine\\'s einews99 e/cbweb.htllll: Press Release, European Union, European COl11mission Takes Steps to
Adapt Banana Import Regime to Enlargement (Mar. 5, 20()4), III http:·iwww.eurunion.orginewsipressi
2()04.20040039.html: Aaron Lukas, )"s. /1" Sell So BIIIIIIIIIIS, III http://www.freetrade. org'pubs/articles i al-122-9R.html (last visited Mar. 1(" 20(5).
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(1) to promote an internal market consisting of absolute free trade between the
members of the Community; and (2) to protect fundamental human rights on a
variety of levels, particularly the right to individual privacy.22
The Needfor Data Protectio/l Regulatio/l Harl1lolli::.atioll ill the EU
Protection of personal data is nothing new in the European context. In
1970, beginning with the German state of Hesse, European nations began to be
cognizant of the potential for abuse of information privacy, particularly as
technology continued to evolve. Consequently, many nations gained data
protection momentum and began enacting regulations to combat what was
perceived as a serious threat to individual liberties. This has consistently been
one of the keystones of the Europcan Community foundation, and was equally
present in many individual nations.23 Not surprisingly, as new and innovative
protectionist methods were adopted in the EU's various member states, significant differences inevitably ensued. Implementation of these ad hoc national
measures commonly included provisions regulating, or even prohibiting,
transnational data tlows, where adequate protection of personal data was not
existing or forthcoming. The disparity among nation states provided a conduit for
high level discussion that eventually led to the drafting of the Directive and the

22 See Directive, .IIII'm note 5, arl. I; .1('(' "Iso FIRSI RI'I'ORI, slI/'ra note 6, at 3 ("'Dircctive 95/46
cnshrincs two ofthc oldest ambitions of the European integration project: the achie\'emcnt of an Internal Markct
, and the protection of tillldamental rights and freedoills of indi\iduals, In the Directive, both objecti\es arc
equally importanl."'),
23 See gCl1crul/t' FinD H. CAIT, PRIVACY IN 1'111; 1:'-]1 OR!\l,\ liON A(,1· ( I l)97) (highlighting that hetween
1970 and 1997 most Europcannations, including those not associated directly \\ith the COlllnlllnity. had cnaeted
sOllle type of data protection policy or specific statutes); sce "lID Patrick .I, 1\lurray. ('()Jl1lllent. Th(' ,·ld(''III({Ci'
Slwl(llIril U))iI"r /)ir('('li,'" IJ5/4fJ'I,'C Ooes US Oal({ Prole('!io)) .\le('{ This SI(/))ilarJ'. 21 h"w"'\~IINr'1 LJ,
932.933 (19l)X) (citing CO"" .I. BI"'1I,IT, RU;lIL\II'I(; PRIIM\ 16 (1992)).
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implementation of an overall policy aimcd at stabilizing the threat to the internal
market of the Community. As one Commission report, studying the potential
impact of the scparate regimes, suggested:

l t]he diversity of national approachcs and thc lack of a
system of protection at the Community level are an obstacle
to completion of the internal market. If the fundamental
rights of data subjccts, ill particular their right to privacy, arc
not safeguarded at Community level, the cross bordcr flow
of data might be impcdcd . . . . 24
If the pcrception that led to the initial focus on data protection rights was
accurate, namely a growth in technological sophistication providing simpler and
more efficient methods of data collection, processing, and diverse usage, there
seems little question that even the 1995 introduction of the Directive was before
its time. Since the drafting of the Directive, there has been a veritable boom of
technological expansion, with ever increasing numbers of consumers and
businesses utilizing the internet as a primary source of operations, both retail and
commerciap:i With the understanding that the internet was designed, and is
commonly refcrred to, as the "information superhighway," it has also emerged as
the ultimate source for the effortless collection of personal data, something that
has been a boon to businesses, a legitimate but often misunderstood fear of
consumers, and a pol itical nightmare for regulators. Indeed, any regular internet
user will attest to the plethora of solicitations for personal information arising

24 FIRS I RII'()R I . .I'llI'm note 6, at 1 (quoting COM(90)114 tlnal. at 4).
25 See

iii.

at

4: see ({Iso

Tf'LI(,()~"ll"ICIIi()"S ('\I',lllIIIIY I"

1'1 III RAI

C()~I~Il:"I<'III()~ C()~I\IISSI()",

!\1',III,IIlIIHY or !\[)\"I''CcLl

U'Illlll SIIII'S, Fourth Report to Congress, {Il'{{il{{hl" {{t
http>/\\\\'\\',ccp,ucia,edu'pages/internct-reporLasp (last visited Apr, (,. 20(5) (stating Ihat t(my-eight Illillion
adults in the United States use high-speed internet access in the hOl1le),
1111
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there. It appears that such rapid technological advances highlight the need for
protection from the violation of an individual's informational privacy.
However, even heightened eognizance of the data protection challenges
associated with the technological explosion does not automatically lead to easily
managed solutions. Traditional means of legislating and regulating commercial
behavior often seem ill equipped in the internet age, leading to attenuated
applications of existing laws Ch and forcing lawmakers to stretch their imaginations to mold statutory constructions to fit a seemingly ethereal global
community, embracing often ephemcral tcchnologies and methods. Perhaps this
was part of the impetus for the broad ranging agenda intended for implementation via the Direetive. n Several years after the promulgation of the Directive,
the European Commission admitted that
"data explosion" inevitably raises the question of whether
legislation can fully cope with some of those challenges,
especially traditional legislation, which has a limited
geographical field of application, with physical frontiers, which
the internet is rapidly rendering increasingly irrelevant. 2x
The Commission itself is certainly aware of the difficult yet necessary task of
identifying an appropriate balance between regulatory idealism and reality, and
indeed is concerned about its own reputation, and the reputation of the

26 SI!I!. eg.. Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003) (t()[cing the courts to apply traditional untilir
bw,iness practice lalls to cOllllllunications widely proliferated through internet and other technologicalmcans
tllr II hieh the laws were never intended).

27 European Union materials suggest that although the Directive is "technologically neutral," the
internet has specitically been considered as an important means of data transfer, particularly in relation to
cOllntric~

that do not meet the criteria for providing adequate proteel ion. DAIA PRO I J:( II():--L

~upra note

15, at

s.

Thus, the tracking of internet users' personal int(lflllation through the l"e of cookies will come under the
Directive, although if information is collected in a l110re visible way, the user may arguably have given consent
to the collection of their int()l'Jl1ation. 1"-. see "I", ill/i,,, text accompanying note 45.
2X FI~s 1
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Community as a whole, as it attempts to stabilize the efficacy of the Directivc. 29
With all of this as a backdrop, on October 24, 1995 the European
Parliament and Council enacted Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data. 10 In addition to a lengthy preamble, the Directive listed
as its primary objective the protection "of the fundamental rights and freedoms
of natural persons ... with respect to the processing of personal data,"1l and,
seeondari Iy, "the free flow of personal data between Member States .... "12

Enactment (fnd Basic P/"(JI'isions of'the Directive
MC/nber States were required to implement the terms of the Directive
into their respective national laws within three years of the date of the
enactment." Significantly, despite pre-existing data protection laws in almost
every nation of the

Union,1~

five members failed to implement appropriate

measures by the 1998 cut off date, and in late 1999, the European Commission
instituted actions in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) against France,

29 .'icc ill/i-li tcxt accompanying note 74.

30 Dircctivc, slIl,m note 5. The Dircctivc was later cxtendcd to bind the three additional members
ofthc European Economic Area. See Decision 3X'I999 01'25 .Junc 1999, 19990..1. (L 296) 41.
31 Jd. art. I (I).

32 Jd. art. 1(2).
33 Jd. art. 32.

34 By 1995, only EU member states Italy and Cireece did not have any data protection legislation in
place, and this situation was the catalyst Illr the most ditticulty in transferring data within the internal market.
Since Italy and Greece were among the first tn implement the Directi\'C into national law. the hee flo\\' of
information difficulties among member states were quickly vitiated, and there has apparently been no case to
date of blocking data transfers between member states, something the Commission touts as a success regarding
the imperatives of the Directive. FIKS I RII'ORI, slIjlm note 6, at 10. It will be intere;.ting to note whether this
succe;.sful run continue;. in the post-aeec"ion era of ten new nations joining the EU earlier this year.
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Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.>s To date, however, all
member states have at least some statutory based regime in place, although some
states are still working on upgrading or fleshing out some of the intricacies. 36
I. Basic prOl'isiolls o/'tIJe Directive.

The Directive broadly covers all processlIlg of personal data ,7 by
controllers 3x or

processors,3~

and anticipates thc formulation of precise defini-

tions of the conditions under which data can be processed by the member states
in their national promulgation. ellJ Use of data regulated under the Directive
includes both private and public sector controllers, and requires them to abide by
certain rules in the use of that data. ell The general rules allowing the processing

35 Press Release. Iluropean Union. Data Protection: Comllli"ion Takes Five Member Statcs to
Court (Jan. II. 20(0). al http://europa . .;u.int'rapid'pre''RekasesAeti()n,do'!refcrence~1 PIOO, IO&format
=HTML&aged= I &languagc=JlN&guiLangllage~en: see aflo FIRs I RIeI'()f{ I. SIIJlI'lI note 6. at 3 n, I,
Commencement of the actions resulted in tllirly swill. bUl not immediate. resolution of the matters. Germany
and France reported their enactments, but \\ ilh all ongoing plan to upgrade their existing data protection laws.
and each of these ca~c:-. was clo~cd b~y the Comllli~~ioll. Ireland gave notice ora partIal cOlllpliance. but ha:-. yet
to reach full concurrence. The action again:-.I Luxembourg weill through the FeJ. and led lo a cOllliclllllalion of

Luxembourg t(lr tailure to fultill its EU obligations, See AI{JICl.l' 29 \VORKIM; PARIY. SI\ III A~NI; II D..\n
PR() IHTION RIP<JI{ I. iII'ai/ah/1! al hltp://europa.cu,int/comm!intcrnal markel'privacy/uocs, wpdocs/2003, 20036lh-annualreport en,pdf (last viSited Mar. 16. 20(5) [hereinaller SIX III A ""11,11 RI'I'ORI [, A complete status of
the implementation of the Directile is available at hllp:!/europa,clI,int'commiinternal markel/privacy/law
!implementation en.htm (last visited Apr. 6. 20(5). Set' a/so AR~t:II . .I'llI'm note !l anu accompanying tcxt
(discussing the potential direct clfect of European uirectives),
36 S(!(' S1.III,S OF 1~1!'IL~lFNIi\lI()N ()I [)IRIClIIT 95/46 ()N 1111. PROIH'II()N 01 INIlIVIJJUAIS \\ITII
R[(;·IIW ro 111[, !'IW( I'SSI"<; 01 PI RSON!l1 DIIA. hllp:l/curopa,eu,inticolllm!internal Illarkel'privacy/law
limpicmcnlation en,htm (last visited Apr. 6. 20(5), In addition. the ten countrie, lilat have recenlly acceded to
the Union. as part of their "Copenhagen criteria" all cnacted uala protection legislation prior to the date of
accession. FIRS I RU'ORI. SlIjJl'lI note 6. at 13.

37 Directive. slII'ra note S. art. 2(b) (This provision in particular highlights the comprehensive. allencompassing. and potentially limitless nature of Ihe Directive's scope. uefining the "processing of personal
data" as "any operation or set of operations which is performeu upon personal data. "hether or not by automatic
means. such as collection, recording. organi/ation. storage. adaptation. or alteration. retrieval. consultation. usc
disclosure by transmission. dissemination or otherwise making available. alignmcnt or combination. blocking.
crasure or destruction").
3X ld arl. l(c),
39 ld art. ltd).

40 Id art. 5,
41 Id arts. 2(u). 6.
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of data require controller or processor to: (a) process such data fairly and
accurately; (b) collect data only for cxplicit and Icgitimate purposes and usc it
accordingly; (c) collcct data accuratcly and kcep it up to date where necessary;
(d) provide reasonable measures for data subjects to rectify, crase, or block
inaccurate data stored about thcm; and (c) not keep data about any subjcct longer
than is necessary.4" In addition, the Directive requires mcmber states to organize
a supervisory authority, which, inter alia, must maintain a register of companies
and individuals controlling data of specified types, and receive notifications from
controllers enumerating its purposes and descriptions of proposed data
processing. 43
Thc Directive also rcgulatcs when data can bc collccted and uscd. 44 Such
occasIOns includc whcn: (a) the data subject has provided unambiguous
consent;45 (b) the processmg

IS

necessary to the performance of a contract

involving the data subject; (c) the processing is required by a legal obligation; (d)
the processing is necessary to protect an interest that is essential to the data
subject's life; or (c) the data controller has a legitimate interest in doing SO.4(, The

42 III. art. ()(a) (d).
43 Se(' id. arts. I ~ 21.
44!d. art. 7.

45 Note that although this requires that the data subject agree ""Ireely and specilically after being
adequately infrmned" this docs not necessarily mean more than acquiescence after having received such notice,
as can be implied Irom the usc of dilfering language in the provision relating to sensitive data. See DATA
PROHTflOt-:. slIpra note 15. at 7: Cr Directive. slIpra note 5. art. R(2)(a) (requiring ""explicit consent" as
opposed to ""unambiguous consent").
46 Directive. SlIlil'll note 5. art. 7(a) (I). The lin'll provision. although seemingly providing a catchall that in practice may be manipulated by unscrupulous data controllers is vitiated by the caveat that it must be
in keeping with the ti.l1ldamental ti"eedollls alluded to in article I (I). \Vhat this means in real terms i, that data
controllers arc responsible to validate with the supervisory processing of data that approaches grey areas. eyen
though the ultimate arbiter of such rights. and the legitimacy of processing operations. will if necessary be
determined by the courts.
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Directive mandates even more stringent requirements to allow the processing of
data considered "sensitive," that is, data dealing with racial or ethnic origin,
political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, and data conceming health
or sex life. 47
In keeping with the explicit purpose of upholding and advancing
fundamental human rights, data subjects are afforded specific remedial opportunities in case of grievances, subject to some necessary qualifications. For
example, data subjects have the right to be informed when personal data is
collected about thcm,-IX thc right to access personal data held about them;l'l the
right to object to inaccurate data held about the subject, the right to object to
certain uses of the subject's personal data,'iO and the right to access information
conceming automated decisions made in relation to personal data. 51 Violations
and complaints regarding the processing of an individual's data can be lodged
with the national supervisory authority, which has a responsibility to investigate
and effect remedial measures where necessary in response to such complaints. If
no satisfactory result is achieved, an individual has recourse to the courts; or if
the complaint is against the member state itself, complaints can be made directly
to the Commission, which must take appropriate steps to settle the matter,
including taking action in the European Court of Justice if necessary.52

47 Id art. X.
4X !d arb. I () I I.

49!d art. 12. Bill sec iii. art. 13 (listing cxcmptions and restrictions on slich rights involving sllch
clements as national security, defense, public security, criminal

SO Id. art. 14.
51 Id art. 15.
52
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Even by looking at this cursory overview of the essential clements of the
regime, it can quickly be adduced that the boundaries of the Directive's
application, far from being clearly defined, are potentially limitless in scope. As
a consequence, there is little question that not only does the Directive burden
almost anyone having any relation to business and commerce with the label of a
"controller," by holding them responsible for abiding by the Directive's
provisions; it is equally clear that there is virtually no chance that the European
Commission or the national supervisory authorities, created by the Directive,
have any viable chance of keeping up with the mandated enforcemenP3
Therefore, the Commission and the national supervisory authorities must pick
their battles

accordingly.'i~

53 S('('. e.g, FIRST RIPORI, slIl,ra note 6, at 12 IJ. The COlllmission admitted that the "ubiquitous"
nature of personal data makes it difficult to obtain accurate int(mnation about compliance with the law. Iii. at
12. It did, however, submit that the evidence collated pointed to three specitie underlying issues regarding
compliance and ent()reement: (a) supervisory authorities are under-resoureed and have such an array ofresponsibilities as to shili cnf()rcement procedures down thc priority chain: (b) "patchy compliance" by data
controllers that arc unwilling to amcnd thcir cxisting mcthod of operations to incorporate rules that arc
"complex and burdensome" when the risk of being caught is so low: and (c) a low level of knowledge among
data subjects, which may be part of the catalyst t()r part (b).!d.

54 Onc example that gives somc insight into this observation is the direct selling industry.
Companics that have operations in multi-level marketing, party-plan or other such methods of direct sales arc
cssentially driven by hundreds of thousands of independent distributors, each of whom store int(mnation
relating to his or her customers, ,md othcr related distributors (referred to as "downlinc" or "nctwork"). Undcr
the remit of the Directive, each of these distributors must annually rcgister with the national supen isory
authority by paying the standard fCc, and must meci all the other obligations under the provisions of their
national laws, including notifying customers and other distributors that they arc storing their pcrsonal
inf(mnation, and providing in/(mnation about the individual's rights pertaining to such in((mnation. Generally
speaking, it cun be presumed that few such entrepreneurs will cvcr expcnd the time. em)rt, and resourccs to
comply with the provisions, and it is even more unlikcly that they will evcr be challcnged on such noncompliance. Other commcntators hav'C noted thatthc logical extensions of the Directive's requiremcnts, iftakcn
litcrally, can impose "extraordinary" obligations. See. e.g., Lafcrrera, SIII'/'(/ note I. Lafcrrera provides the
example of an employer who keeps a list of its cmployee's names and telephone extensions, noting thattechnically it is processing data within the mcaning of the Directive and theret()rc must obtain consent of the
employee, or notify the employee any lime Ihe int(lfI11alion is provided to a third parly. Id. There is some
c\ idcncc to uclllon . . tratc thaI employers arc not hantically contactillg their lawyers to audit e\'ery t~lcct of their
c01l1pallic~' data pnl(c:-,:-.ing, an apathy lilal may lead to Illore egregiolls examples of data protection violations:

but pari of this generallelhargy f{Jr businesses meeting their data prolcction obligations may have been spurred
by the extraordinary reach of the Direclive, and the tacit understanding that there is virtually no chance that
national supervisory authorities could, even if they had the motivation, police or cnt()J'ce thc terms of the
Directive to any substantial extent.
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With this in mind, the results of research conducted by the Commission
shed some light on some of the more interesting considerations that help to gauge
public perception, and the efficacy of the Directive in making an impact on the
personal data markets. For example, the Commission found that despite the
Directive's requirement of apparently high standards of data privacy, 44% of
survey respondents considered the standards as a minimum protection of their
personal data rights. 55 Somewhat paradoxically, R I % of respondents also
considered the level of awareness of individuals regarding data protection rights
to be insufficient, bad, or very badY' The same investigation also revealed that

although there was a general acceptance among busincsscs of the need for data
protection rights,57 there seemed to be a general apathy towards fulfilling the
obligations towards individuals when such data protection rights were
exercised.5~

2. Tralls/ers olpersolla/ in/c)J"!l1{1lioll to "third cOlilltries "-article 25 hasics

Undoubtedly, the most publicized, contentious, and onerous (at least
from a non-EU nation perspective) provisions contained in the Directive are
those that relate to the transfer of personal data to so-called "third countries."

59

In essence, the Directive blocks all international transfers of data to countries

55 FIRSI RIPORI, s"pra note 6. at 9. It is worth noting that the Commission is not to be considered
I(Jr what il i, worlh, and
it is cOlllmitted to conuucting additional rc~carch into sllch n,:spoIlSC~ ill the future. It!.
561d

'b reliable a, a ,cicnlitieally ,elected ,un e:,. but it reporled Ihe public l<lI'lUll kedback

57 Id. (showing that almost 70% of businesses that participated in the survey concurred that data
prolection regulation was lIecessary to society).
58 Id. (highlighting that more than 60% of bu,ine,"es did not consider it an important function
within their business to respond to relJuests for access to all individual's personal information. One suspects that
this may be only part of the story).
59 S('(' Directive.
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outside of the EU, where the "third country docs not ensure an 'adequate level of
protection' ."w Findings of adequacy arc made by the Commission, in consul-

tation with the Working Party established under article 29 of the Directive.
Member States have an obligation to inform the Commission of countries that do
not enshrine such adequate protection (although this seems redundant since
transfers are not authorized on a blanket basis without the express approval of the
Commission).1l1 At first blush, such a rule, particularly given the scope of the data
encompassed by thc Directive, would seem to invite the wheels of commerce to
come to a screeching halt. But as with any good rule, there are exceptions, and
article 26 of the Directive contains several.
The first set of "derogations" virtually mirror those provided for the
collection of data generally, but of course these same parameters must be
consistent with the international level at which such transfers will operate. So, for
example, a transfer to a third country may take place on condition of
unambiguous consent of the data subject, but the consent must no longer be just
for the collection of the processing of the personal data, but for the specific
transfer to a third country that may not provide parallel treatment of personal
data. 1l2 Other standard derogations include those for the necessary performance
of a contract involving thc data subject, transfers required by law, and transfers
nccessary to protcct thc interests of the data subjccU"

60 Ill. art. 25( I ).

61 SI!I! ill. art. 25(2) (6).

62!d. arl. 2(1( 1)(a)
63 !d. art. 26.
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Other than these relatively straight-forward derogations, there is a "cover
the bases type exception" that basically provides for transfers to be made to third
countries not supplying nationally incorporated data protection where "adequate
safeguards can be adduced 'with respect to the protection of the privacy and
fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals '"

,"'h4

As will be discussed, this

opens up several doors of opportunity for countries that have historically taken a
more "sectoral" or self-regulating approach regarding data protection, allowing
such countries to obviate the need for a complete legislative overhaul in thc field
of data privacy, It is under this derogation that the United Statcs managed to
carve out its own unique solution for thc continuance of fi'ec data sharing from
EU entities to cel1ain qualifying entitics in the United Statcs,h5 It is also the
derogation provision that incited the Commission, with appropriate consultation,
to craft and adopt standard contractual clauses that can be uti lized by entities
wishing to transfer data intcrnationally in order to fulfill the adequate safeguards
required by the derogation,f>(,

III.

INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS~RE(JULArION, ENFORCEMENT, AND
('[Rl'lJMVENT[ON

The General Adeqll(/cy Reqllirement/hr Third COlll1{rV 7hllls/ers

Pursuant to article 25 of the Directive, member states must ensure that
transfers of personal data must take place only after a determination has been

64 Id. al'l. 26( 2>-

65 Sec ill!;-(/ text accompanying section C.
66 Commission Dccision2001!497. 20010..1. (L Igl) 19.
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made that the intended nation of the recipient provides "adequate proteetion."67
However, the Directive (or, for that matter, other prior or subsequent Community
documents) docs not provide much guidance on how adequacy is to be defined
or determined, other than to state that it should be "assessed in the light of all the
circumstances surrounding the data transfer" on a case-by-case basis. 6X Of
course, one significant departure from this is enshrined in article 26(2), and
allows member states to authorize a transfer or set of transfers to a third country
not engendering adequate protection across the board where the controller
"adduces adequate safeguards" with respect to the fundamental aims of the
DirectiveY) This trickle-down right and responsibility of the member states
would seem to provide the necessary flexibility to avoid over-encumbrance of
intemational transactions in respect of data privacy requirements where the third
country as a whole lacks adequate protection, particularly given the minute
number of nations adjudged to meet the national requirement. However, the
Commission has highlighted concerns over the divergence in member state
implementation,70 and the threat this poses to the aims of the Directive. 71

67 Direclive, IlIfJro note 5, art. 2S( I). A finding of adequacy may bc determined based on the
domestic law of the cOllntry seeking to gain such a designation or on international commitments entered into
il1/m
with the Commission. such as is the case with the Safe Harbor Agreemcnt between the EU and U.S.
Section C.

S""

6X For a comprehcnsive ovcrvicw and discussion of the operations and ramifications of the
adequacy requirement, see Murray, 11I1!m note 23.
69 Directive,

11I1!m

nole 5, art. 26(2): "'(' ,,/10 iii. art.

70 SI!(, FIRSI RI'I'ORI.

11I1!m

I( I).

note 6, at IX.

71 See D\IA PR()[I-l IIO\J, 11I1!m note IS, at 12 (articulating the primary fear of the Commission that
without consistent application in international transfers of the high standards of data protection adopted in the
Directive. the purpose of those standards would be quickly undermined givcn thc pace at which data transfers
can pervade international networks).
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The Commission noted, for example, that some member states filtered
the adequacy determination down to the controllers themselves with very limited
control or input from thc supervisory authority. This naturally has the effect of
diluting the standard of the adequacy determinations and falling short of the
article 25 obligations, even if controllers act in a purely legitimate or innocuous
fashion.7 2 On the other hand, some member states have taken the micromanagement approach of requiring all data transfers to third countries to pass an
administrative approval process, including transfers to countries and controllers
already determined by the Commission to meet blanket adcquacy protection. 73
The Commission has found this approach to be both onerous and unnecessary in
its logistical application and equally inconsistent with the Directive's mandate to
protect flows of data without unnecessary burdens. 74

1. Findings aj'national adequa(y to date
Under the Directive, the Commission was imbued with the power to
determine, in accordance with article 25(5), that a country possesses a regime of
data privacy that ensures adequate protection regardless of the identity of the
controller.75 The consequence of such a decision is that data transfers can occur
between anyone of the twenty-five member states and the three European
72 FlRo T RHOR I • .IIII'm notc 6. at I K.

73 Id.

74 lei. (stating that "[aln overly lax attitude in somc MCll1bcr Statcs in addition to bcing in contravention of thc Dircctivc risks weakcning protection in the EU as a whole. becausc with the ti"ee movement
guarantced by the Directive. data flows arc likely to switch to the' least burdensome' point of export. An overly
strict approach. on the other hand. would tail to respect thc legitimate needs of international trade and the reality
of global telecomll1unications networks . . . which is damaging t(>r the credibility of the Directive and fix
Comll1unity law in gcncraL").
75 Cm,IMlssIO'J DI(ISIO'JS ON Jill AIlI()IIAl"V (JI 1111·. PIWIITIIO'J ()I PJRSO'JAI D.HA I~ THIRIl
http:/europa.eu.inticomm'intcrnal market 'privacy/adequacy cn.htm (last \ isitcd Mar. 20. 2()OS)
[hercinatler [XlISI();'S ()'J Aill (.HI.\( \ I.

COli:': IRIIS.
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Economic Area members, without any necessity for additional safeguards. In the
post-Directive era, several countries have completed radical overhauls of their
data privacy policies, some for the direct purpose of falling into line with the
Directive's adequacy requirements. However, it remains that very few countries
have so far qualified for an adequacy finding by the Commission. 7(, To date, the
Commission has issued decisions verifying the adequacy of protection in only
Switzerland (in 2000), Canada (in 20(1), Guernsey (in 20(3), Argentina (also in
2(03), and the Isle of Man (in 2(04).77

Other countries have tried and failed to satisfy the requirements that the
EU is apparently looking for before assigning an adequacy label. For example,
Australia implemented its Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act in 2000, at
least partially in response to the Directive, to bring Australia's data protection
regime into line with the

requirements7~

and simplify the transfer process

between Australian companies and their European trading partners.7 9 The EU
Commission rejected the comprehensive privacy law as inadequate, much to the
chagrin of Australia's Attorney-General, who vehemently disagreed and
lambasted the European Union for not getting its own house in order and not
recognizing or understanding the extent or et1icacy of the privacy regime. XII The

76 See iii.

77M
]X

See Harvey & Verska,

SII/!!"II

note 14.

79 Sce Attorney-General Daryl Williams, Film/willi

DII/II

"m/ce/ioll COllllllissiO//i'r \. OpillilJll

or

http://www.ag.gov.au/www/attorneygeneraIHome.nsfinXC9464056(.ERI69(.(·A256
85AOO 131 XDF'Opcn[)oelll11cnt (last visited Apr. 6, 20(5).

Alls/ra/ill \. Pril'llC!'

1.(/1\',

XO See id.: see II/SO SIXIII Ar-;Nl:i\1 RI·I'ORI. sllpra note 35, at 22 (discussing thc reasons advised by
thc Articlc 29 Working Party. adhcrcd to by the Commission, tlll' a negative adequacy finding against Australia).
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Attorney-General lauded Australia's legislation, remarking that although the
Australian government would continue to work with EC officials to resolve the
issue, it would not impose restrictions and requirements that unnecessarily
burden businesses. x1

It is not unreasonable to extrapolate from the current position regarding
adequacy findings by the Commission that the EU may have set the bar too high,
and as a consequence nations arc finding it difficult to install a framework that
fits their own legislative policies and theories while meeting the EU's projected
requirements. Of course, one additional explanation, and one that is not without
merit, is that many nations and entities within those nations simply do not
understand what the EU is requiring them to do. x2 Either way, it is quite possible
that what the EU is looking for is not in fact adequacy of national privacy laws,
but is instead equim/ellce of national privacy laws. In that respect, given that no
independent country can realistically afford to entirely forego international trade
with the EU and its members, it is feasible to suggest that the EU's Directive goes
beyond the regulation of its own borders and is in reality tantamount to
introducing a worldwide privacy regime through the baekdoor.
Nevertheless, there arc available arrangements other than simply finding
a way to weave national legislative policies into the EU's adequacy standard.
Most notable among those, and one of the most widely discussed and monitored

S I Williams,

.1'111'/'(/

note 79.

X2 AIIsl/'(//iall CO/llpallin Lillgeil' igllo/'(/1I1 of f:'{j Dala Prol(!cliOIl L(/\\'s, PRIVACyExCH""(;F.(lR(;,
Mar. 22. 200 I. (/1 hllp:; .. www.privacyexchangc.org/news/archivcs/gpd/globde\OI06.htm\: SI!I! aiso Murray,
note 23 (describing in de(ail (he difticulties and intricacies associated with (he l'U's adequacy standard,
including a misunderstanding of the requircments by third countries and differing opinions \\ithin the EU).

.1'111'/'(/
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results of the Directive to date, is the U.S. Safe Harbor Agreement,x' which has
the general purpose of allowing U.S. eompanies to self-certify to specific privacy
policies, thus obviating the need for an adequacy determination (for which the
United States certainly does not qualify), but fulfilling the identical purpose for
those companies that register for the program.X4

Standard Contracllial Cla/lses-an Additional Option fc)r Compliance

In addition to the two categories of general provisions allowing
continuity of international transfers, the EU has also created a non-exclusive set
of standard contractual clauses that can bc negotiated in individual contracts for
transactions that involve personal data transfersY' The standard clauses are
simply intended to be one additional option for controllers to qualify for transfers
of personal data to third countries under the Directive and ostensibly have no
impact on the adequacy decisions of the Commission. Entities wishing to transfer
such data can still rely on contracts already drafted and approved by national
supervisory authorities, but only under rare and specified circumstances will a

X3 Sec Die ISIO"S ON AIlH)II,'I(Y. slIl,m notc 75 (providing Safe Harbor Agrccmcnt decisions.
overvicws. and documcnts); scc IIlso U.S. Dl-I'AR r~tt.r-. I 01· COM~1FR(,E. SArE HARIlOR.
http://\\\V\v.c'(port.gov/safeharbor/ (Ias( visited Apr. 6. 20(5).
X4!d Also worthy ofnotc. but not discussed in detail within thc scopc (lfthis papcr is the agrecment
bctwccn thc Europcan Community and thc Unitcd States. pursuant to a Commission adcquacy tinding. on thc
proccssing and transfer of air passengcr name records (PNR). which gcnerally makes it allowablc for airlincs
opcrating out of the IOU to transfer passcngcr data to the U.s. Dcpartmcnt of Homcland Sccurity to support
national sccurity mcasures in the wake of the') II disastcr. Scc id: Press Releasc. Europcan Commission.
Intcrnational Agreemcnt on Passcnger Name Records (PNR) linters Into Force (May 2X. 20(4). III
h tlp:/ / europa.cu. int/rapid/ pressRe leasesAct ion .do"rcference= IP/()4!6,)4& format= HTM L&agcd=O&languagc=c
n&guiLanguage=en: SCI' IIlso Prcss Rclease. U.S. Dcpartment of State. U.S .• EU Agree On Air
Passenger Data Transfer (Dcc. 16. 20(3), III http://w\\.w.useu.be/Terrorism!USRcsponseiDcc 1603 PN R
Agrecmcnt.html.

X5 Sce gCl1cralh· !:t:lwrIA"-: C{)\1~IISSI0". MOIlI I CO" iRA( TS lOR I IIF TRANSII-R Oi PcRS{)"AI DAIA
To THIRD COI:CJ I RIIS. !II http://europa.cu.inticoml11/internal market/priv-acy/modclcontraets en.htm (last
visited Apr. 6. 2()())) (providing documcnts dcaling with the drafting, discussion. adoption. notitlcation. and
frcqucntly askcd questions rcgarding thc Commission's standard contractual clauscs j(,r thc transfer ofpcrs()nal
data to third countries).
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supervisory authority have the capacity to block transfers that seek to make use
of the Commission's clauses.xl>
Notwithstanding thc additional options for flexibility and compliance
that the standard clauses provide, particularly for a business that does not wish to
undergo a full scale investigation and revamp of its privacy policy, the plan has
met with mixed reactions by commentators and practitioners. x7 Some have
applauded the policy for handing businesses an option allowing them to stay out
of official programs such as thc Safe Harbor. xx Meanwhile, others have cautioned
against the inextricable, onerous, and perhaps unacceptable business implications that come with use of the standard clauses, such as the inclusion of data
subjects as third party beneficiaries of contracts (which has varying ramifications
according to local contractual principles),Xl) which makes data importers subject
to audit by a supervisory authority and possible restriction in the choice of
applicable law and court jurisdiction. 9()
This brief overview of the basic parameters and alternatives for
continued transfers under the Directive of personal data to third countries
naturally leads to the issue of the U.S. response, particularly in light of the
immense scale of trade between the United States and the EU.91

~6 s~~ id (discussing allowablc blockagcs of transtl:rs using the standard contractual clauses under
circumstances such as where the clauses are not res peeled by thc importing controller or processor. or constitute
a grave risk of harm to data subjects).
g7 Se(' Alexander Zinser. The fllm!,"'"1 CO/lllllisl'/OIl /)('cisioll Oil Slalldllld Clalls(,1
o/Per.\()lIal Da/(ilo Third ('olllllries: .111 f''f/~('li\'~ SOllllioll:). 3.1. INIIII. PIWI'. 2-1 (2003) .

Ii,,' Ihe

T/'{/I/Sjer

. XX S~~ gelleralll' illl;'a notes 92 III and accompanying text.
Xl) Zinser.

SIIJJI'(/

note X7. at 32 3'>.

c.s.

90 Se~ Ill.: see also Stephen II. LaCount et al.. L'lIm!,~"" Cllioll /)al" Pmlcelioll f)ir~('li\'e (llId
Sali' Harho}" All t;llI!'lm'('/' UJ/(I(/I~ (Sept. 7. 2()04). (/1 http://www.nix(\npeabody.comlinked media publications PncyAlcrt 0907200-l.pdf

YI
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The EU-U.S. Safe Harhor Agreement, its Implemelltation, Etfica(]', and
Progression
1. Backgrollnd to Us. data primc.\'
While the European perspective on personal data has been geared
towards comprehensive public intervention, with priority exclusively preserved
for individual rights, the U.S. has consistently preferred a market-based or selfregulatory approach that has developed into what the Departmcnt of Commerce
has described as "sectoral," with legislative solutions forthcoming to govem
more sensitive areas of personal data transactions.92 There are certainly plenty of
pros and cons associated with the differing theories. From the pcrspective of
advocates of the European doctrine, the U.S. approach leaves too much to chance
in the realm of fundamental human rights, leaving individuals uninformed and
overexposed to the insidious acts of more sophisticated parties. 9] From the U.S.
standpoint, the sectoral approach may allow for a higher level of information
flow, based firmly on First Amendment grounds, thus imbuing citizens with
"significant economic and social benefits," in addition to reinforcing a "healthy
distrust for goveml11ental solutions, preferring instead rcliance upon entrepreneurial and market hased proteetions."94 There is little doubt that such founda92 See SoYII' H \1~Il()R W()R~Il()()~. Stll)/'({ note 12: see "/1'0 Assey & l'IcHheriou. SIll'/'({ note 4. at
149 50 (discussing the U,S, approach that predominantly incorporatcs industry norms. codes of conduct. and
the consumer markctplace. and ft1ClISes only secondarily on legislative measures targeted towards specific
sectors of the economy): see "/,,, l"lIance of Safe liarbor Principles and Transmissions to Furopean
Commission. 65 Fed, Reg, 4566(), 45666 67 (July 24. 2(00) (stating thaI, "Iwlhilc the United States and
European Union share the goal of enhancing privacy protection ft)r their citizens. the United States takes a
ditferent approach to privacy trom that takcn by the I'uropean Union, The United States uses a sectoral
approach that relics on a mix of Icgislation. regulation. and selt~regulatiot1,") Ihereinatier SAH HARHOR
PRt"CIPIl'sl,

93 Asscy & Eletiheriou. ,I'llI'm note 4. at 149 50,
94 M at ISO,
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tional philosophical differences, at least in part, are sufficient to prevent any type
of general adequacy finding by the Commission regarding the United States as a
nation.
Notwithstanding these obvious difTerences, both the EU and the United
States were highly cognizant of the significant amount ofcol11merce between the
two trading blocks that could potentially be afTected by the provisions of the
Directive and the interests of both parties that were at stake. Consequently, the
EU and the U.S. Depmtment of Commerce entered into negotiations to layout a
framework that would provide the requisite "adequacy" under the Directive on
an individual-company or public-entity level, without the need for wholesale
changes to current U.S. data privacy laws.

2. The Sale Harhor Agreementji'wllcl1'ork-hasic principlcs
Following intense and protracted negotiations between the EU and the
United States,Y5 on July 24, 2000, the Department of Commerce finally
issued%-and the EU promptly accepted'!7-the principles of the so-called Safe
Harbor Agreement, heralding the beginning of a new era in LJ .S. personal data
protection. The basic thrust of the Safe Harbor Agreement (SHA) and its
principles is to provide U.S. organizations with an etTective and straightforward
means of transposing the Directive's data protection requirements into their

95 S"" David A. Castor. lin/(Iillg Hilla ill IIIl' nala Prime)' Age All Allail'sis o(111l' Sa!e I!"r/Jor \
Finl l""r, 12 I"D. len 'L & COMP. L. RI\'. 265, 275 76 (2002) (highlighting thc fundamcntal di"lgrccmcnt
betwcen thc partics rcgarding thc bcst way to procecd, thc request of thc IOU that the U.S. implemcnt federal
legislation govcrning the usc of pcrsonal data by cOlllmercial entities, and the EU's rejection of live separatc
proposals by the U.S. bct()rc rcaching an agrcemcnt).

96 S\lI' H \RIl()K

PRIr-:cIPI I'S, \'/IIi/'"

note 92.

97 Commission Decision 200()l520, 2000 0..1. (L 21) 5, 7.
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operations, thereby avoiding any concerns for both them and their EU data
exporters that they will be found in violation by the EU and consequently be
subject to enforcement under the Directive. 9x There are of course some important
limitations in the fields of national security, public interest, conflicts with
existing U.S. law, and other similarly bona fide departures.'!'! The SHA is a purely
voluntary scheme, but those organizations that decide to take advantage of its
provisions are encouraged to "implement the principles fully and transparently,"
and apply the principles to all data processing and transfers following registration
in the seheme. loo
The substance of the SHA is embodied in the seven basic principles
which Safe Harbor registered organizations must entrench into their policies and
procedures. The principles are: notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data
integrity, access, and enforcement. Furthermore, organizations must self·certify
annually to qualify for the ongoing benefits of the program. 101

Notice. The notice requirement requires organizations to inform
individuals about the purposes for which information is being collected, provide
contact details for the organization to facilitate complaints by data subjects,
inform subjects of any third party use of the data, and make available the means
to communicate to the organization choices regarding the use of the data. Notice
must be clear and conspicuous, and must be provided on the front end of any data
9R SMF IhRIlOI( PRINCIPII s. slIl'm note 92. at 45666 (,7.
99 Iii. al 45(,6(,.
100 Id.
101 For a list (lfthc rcgistration rcquirclllcnts. scc U.S. DIPARr~ll"r OF CO~IMFR(T. l'JI'()R~IATIOi\
RH)I.IRF[) lOR SAl I, llARIlOI( CI'R I III(.\IIO'J. al hllp: '\\Ww.cxporl.govisafcharbor/sh rcgistration.htllli (last
visitcd Mar. 20. 20(15).
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transaction whcre reasonably practicable. Failing that, it must be provided as
soon as possible thereafter. 102

Choice. Under the choice princip\c, organizations must provide
individuals with an opportunity to "opt out" from disclosure of their information
to third parties or other data uses that are incompatible with the original purposes
for which the data is collected. To facilitate this option, organizations must
provide to individuals clear and readily available information and mechanisms.
More stringent requirements apply to the processing of "sensitive data" as
defined by the Directive, requiring a conscious "opt in" facility. ml

Onward transleJ: Onward transfer of data may only occur where the
notice and choice provisions are adhered to. Most importantly, however, for the
successful operation of the SHA, such transfers may only be made where that
party is also registered under the SHA or is otherwise in compliance with a
commensurate level of data protection, such as a written agreement binding the
party to the SHA principles for that spccific transaction. III,)

Security. Processors of personal data under the SHA must take
reasonable steps to prevent personal data collected and used from "loss, misuse,
and unauthorized access, disclosure, alteration, and destruction."11I5

Data integrity. In accordance with the Directive, the SHA requires that
personal data should be relevant for the purposes for whieh it is collected, must

102

SAri' H.\RBOR PRIMIPI IS, .1{fIJru

103 Id. at 45667-68.
104 Id. at 45(,68.
lOS Id.
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be used in aecordance with the purposes for whieh it was eollected, and should
be initially authorized by the individual. Consistent with this, SHA organizations
arc required to ensure that the information is reliable, accurate, complete, and
current insofar as necessary for the purposes of its intended usc. lOr,
Access. The access requirement is closely linked to the data integrity
requirement. Pursuant to the requirement, individuals must be granted access to
the infonnation that an organization holds about them, and must be endowed
with the ability to delete, correct, or amend such data, provided that the expense
of maintaining such an operation is not unreasonably disproportionate to the
rights of the individual and does not affect the rights of persons other than the
individual. lo7

Enlorcement. Enforcement contemplates the usc of mechanisms, both
public and private, to ensure compliance by those participating in the SHA. Not
only must organizations annually certify, but the SHA anticipates use of federal
and state law to enforce obligations, as well as the availability, designated by the
organization, of an independent resolution body to handle disputes that are
unresolved between the organization and the individual. IIiX
Clearly, even these basic principles raise many questions regarding
procedure, policy, and to what extent U.S. organizations will actually benefit by

106 !d.
107 Iii.
108 Iii. The Federal Register cntry enumcrating these principles also provides a usctiil FAQ section,
commentary. and assessmcnts, which provide a more detailed analysis of the principles, their anticipated
promulgalion, derogations, concerns, and benelits . .'leI' id. at 4566~ RS. One additional point that should be
made is that organizations may cordon oIl scctors of their data privacy operations to mcct the SHA, for example
in the context of human resources records. which may be far more manageable in the SHA context than a
complete organintion-wide overhaul.
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signing up to a schcme that incorporates principles unfamiliar to many organizations and forces them to make significant changes in their information systems,
the education of their workforce, and perhaps even their technological capabilities. 11I9 Not surprisingly then, the SHA has had, and continues to have, its critics.
Some argue that compliance with its principles is too costly, unfair, and
unmanageable, an argument concurrent with finger-pointing at alleged EU
hypocrisy by not putting its own house in order before seeking to expand its
jurisdictional power in the data privacy field far beyond its own borders. I III With
that said, the SHA has been gaining momentum as organizations have leamed of
its benefits, recognizing it as simply one means of ensuring unfettered continuation of personal data transfers from EU-based entities to their U.S. counterparts-certainly not the most appropriate approach for everyone, and certainly
not without its flaws in conception or implementation. I I I
3. IlIIplelllell/a{ioll ([lid progress of the SlIA-w/ ollgoillg ulld illlPcr/ect {ellure

Given the SHA's unique status among the responses to the EU's
Directive, and no doubt due to the size and economic power of the U.S., the EU
has been dedicated to ongoing scrutiny of the SHA's implementation and
efficacy. Combining this paradigm with the EU's apparent paranoia I 12 about its

109 For a general discussion of the benetits and costs of signing onto the scheme, sec i\ssey &
Eletlheriou, slIpra note 4, at 156. The article also contains a useful discussion of what an organization should
consider when deciding whether to enroll in the program. and if so. what steps I11Ust be taken at a foundational
!eycl to commence the transition to compliance with the principles. It!. at 156 5X; see a/so Castor, .1'111'1'([ note
95, at 279 X6 (analyzing costs and benetits ofthe SHi\. both actual and contemplated).
II () Asscy & I'Idlhcriou .

.1'111"'(/

note 4, at ISX.

III 5;<,<, gel/('/'al/r El,J{(JPL~~ CmlMISSIOI'i, Cml~lISSI0N S IAII WOKKIN(; D()('ll~lI'" I, SEC (2004)

1323, [hereinatler SIAl! WOHKIN(; DOClI~II"II; see al,,, '/1\" DIIONI
hll'll'II"I"II()" SillilY (2004) Ihereinalkr 1\11'11'11 NL\II()'J SillilY I.
112 See
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reputation resulting from its indirect attempt to take the Directive around the
world, it is easy to understand why the EU is so adamant that the program be
carefully monitored, and that improvement and support in and f)'om the U.S. is
forthcoming. Earlier this year, as part of its ongoing investigation of the
implementation of the SHA, the Commission requested a joint study be made
involving the knowledge and experience of scholars from the EU, European
Economic Area, and the United States. I 1.1 This study was followed by the recent
release of the Commission's second report pertaining to the "implementation of
Commission Decision 520/2000/EC on the adequate protection of personal data
provided by the Safe Harbor Privacy Principles and related Frequently Asked
Questions issued by the US Department of Commerce."114
The attraction of organizations to the SHA has been far from numerically
impressive in its initial years.II" A number of reasons have been cited for this,
including for instance: companies arc reticent to make legal commitments that
may lead to liability in the United States for the purpose of satisfying eontemptuously perceived European rights problems; organizations lack understanding of
the SHA, its requirements, and purposes; and, given the apparent lack of the
wide-scale enforcement organizations and measures, they choose to "lay low"
until such time as they r('a/~r have to take steps to eome above board.llC,

113

1\11'11-,\/1,/\ 1""0/\

S, L'Il\, . .III/1m note III.

114SIAII WORKIJ\(;[)OCL'Mrl\'.SlIpmnote III,
115 SCI! Castor. .IIII'm note 95. at 2XO (pointing out that only 124 U.S. companies had signed up Illr
the sehcme by the end of the first year. many of thcm small and mcdium-sized businesses); S L\IT WORKI/\(;
DOll'\lr/\] . .IIII'm note III. at 5 (discussing the continued growth of SHA rcgistration each year and the
increased protection cnsuing tiuIll thcse registrations. but expressing disappointment at thc overall number.
w hieh is less than initially anticipated. and hoping that thc recommendations of the report will Icad to grcatcr
pcrvasi\'cness of certifications in the tllturc),

II (, Sec LatCrrera . .III/1m note I. ;\"cy & Elctlherioll . .III/Ira note 4. at 156 5X;
Vcrska . .IIII'm note 14,

,ICC ,,/,10

Harvey &
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Furthermore, other organizations may have avoided embarking on broad
upgrades to their teehnology and human resources facilities to meet an underenforced standard that they know they may not be able to adequately uphold, at
least in the short term.117 Even though there are about 600 currently-registered
participants of the Safe Harbor program, this number no doubt only represents a
tiny fraction of the U.S. entities that process data f"i'om EU organizations.
Naturally, therefore, it can be safely assumed that even though there are several
alternative measures available to legitimize transfers of personal data from the
EU, there arc probably a vast number of U.S. companies that arc choosing, at
least for now, to comply only with their U.S. obligations and will deal with the
EU ramifications if and when they arise. At this juncture, where enforcement
mechanisms arc at a minimum and a company can seemingly fly under the radar,
incentives to join the Safe Harbor agreement are, temporarily it would seem, at
a minimum-absent an officious EU-based entity requiring strict adherence by a
U.S. transferee. However, even this seems unlikely in the faee of a low
percentage of enforcement among the EU member states.
Even those companies that have certified under the SHA have apparently
struggled to meet even the bare minimum commitments that they have made. llx
Both the Commission Report and the implementation study noted serious
deficiencies in almost every aspeet of the basie principles of the SHA, with
virtually no celiified organizations possessing privacy policies that reflect all

117

Haney & Verska . .I'1i/!!·iI note 14.
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seven of the SHA principles. I It) The Commission recommended several courses
of action to bring organizations into compliance with the principles, including its
own involvement in some of the proposed processes. 120 These included, for
example: more rigorous respect for the SHA principles, with greater commitment
and compliance generally by SHA companies; a more proactive stance on the
part of the Oepal1ment of Commerce with respect to ensuring viability of public
privacy policies upon certification; more proactive monitoring by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) in line with the "assiduousness" it had applied to
spam-related matters; and increased use of power by data protection authorities
(OPAs) to suspend data transfers, even to Safe Harbor-certified organizations,
when there is a "substantial likelihood" of noncompliance. lei
In addition, the Commission Report also independently examined the
role of all relevant pal1icipants from the U.S. side of the SHA, including the
Department of Commerce, the FTC, independent resolution bodies, and the EU
OPA's, and found need for improvement in each area. Ice The Commission was at
least magnanimous enough to provide suggestions for remedial action to correct
those dcficiencies. 121 In conclusion, the Report expressed a mix of encoUfagel11ent and frustration, but the Commission was sufficiently satisfied to allow
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SIMI W()RKI'J<i

[)()(I'~II'J I • .Il1lml nolc

III.

at X.

120 / d.
121 !d
122 Id. at 9 13: .ICC a/so IMI'II'~II'NI,\II()N SII:DY. I'lli'm note III, at 105 II (analY7ing the
dcticiencies the study identified in the \'arious areas of the SHA implcmentation. and suggcsting mechanisms
tl1l' impnncmcnt and nolably including clcarer guidancc and policing on the part of thc Dcpartmcnt of
COlllmcrce).

123 Id. at 13 14.
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operations to continue without radical changes, simply suggesting improvement
across the board. 124
Despite the positive indications expressed by the Commission, it is
difficult not to infer from the report some sense of exasperation, not necessarily
directed towards the United States, but perhaps because it has become a victim
of its own broad policies. Understanding that the United States is simply one
jurisdiction to which the Commission inevitably must extend its data protection
activities-albeit a very impOliant one from a trade perspective, and as an
exemplary nation for data protection standards-one perception is that the
Commission may have stretched itself beyond capacity from a global-regulatory,
or at least an enforcement, perspective. Though it is difTicult to sympathize with
the EU's plight, let alone empathize with it, one gets the sense that the EU
desperately wants to elicit the U.S. 's full coopcration as it attempts to enforce its
legislative policies outside of the traditional boundaries. Looking at that position
from an objective standpoint, aside from the potential economic meltdown that
may occur as a result of failure to at least facially cooperate, the proclivities
associated with the need for national autonomy seem to militate against the U.S.
ofTering its very best cfTorts to get the EU out of its self-imposed jam.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Perceived from U.S. eyes, concerns have been expressed in a general
vein regarding the desirability of allowing the EU to dictate the parameters of
personal data protection regulations in a U .S.

124/d
125 Sec'. e.g .. ;\ssc y & Elefthcr;ou. IIII'm
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been assessed that the need for U.S. entity compliance with the Directive's
principles, whether through the SHA or one of the altematives, could leave U.S.
citizens feeling like "second class citizens within their own country."12!>
Furthennore, and perhaps most difficult to rebut, is the argument that by compromising sufficiently to negotiate the SHA, the United States ultimately capitulated
by giving up some small part of its sovereignty to the EU. In
Accusations of usurping sovereign powers beyond acceptable levels is
nothing new to the European Union; it is the very fight it has had with many of
the individual states in its own

CommunityY'~

The key distinction, of course, is

that those nations explicitly agreed to limit their sovereignty to some extent, even
if the boundaries of that relinquishment are undefined and are perhaps dynamic.
But such allegations have rarely been discussed in terms of nations not within the
European Community, where the institutions of the Community, at least
ostensibly, have no real authority to mandate any form of regulatory regime.
Even though intemational law is a somewhat ethereal concept and flows
to and fro with the tides of the seas that separate the nations, one general
principle that stands out is that national autonomy should rarely be encroached
upon by over-reaching intemational neighbors. One practical protection against
over-reaching is that if nations do not buy into the proposed restrictions on more
than a cursory level, proposed restrictions simply will not be consistently applied
or enforced, despite the best efforts or intentions of the promulgator. Such is the

126 Id.

In Id.
12X Sec AR~III.I • supra nole (, and accompanying lex!.
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case with the EU's data protection directive. Taken to their logical extension, the
terms of the Directive span every nation, every privacy regime, and every entity
within thosc nations. Naturally, enforcement of such broad and large-scale
concepts is ditTicult to police to any great extent. Furthermore, with the EU
evidencing scant and insufficient ability to accomplish effective regulation, even
within its own jurisdiction, it seems that at least for the foreseeable future the EU
has an uphill battle in taking its interventionist approach to fundamental
freedoms and individual privacy around the globe. Consequently, of all the
dynamics relating to the Directive that will inevitably play out in the future,
consistent interpretation and en forcement of the EU's data protection regime
undoubtedly remain at the hcat1 of its potential success.

Seth P Hobby
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